Corrections Telecommunication and Technology
F. Warren Benton, Ph.D.
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Here's the story. Since the 1970s, the prison has been home to a model correctional industries program involving Control Data Corporation. Prisoners provided telemarketing and database management services to private-sector customers including major corporations. The program has demonstrated how private sector involvement in correctional industries can work. I am among the many correctional professionals who have considered it a model program.
Like many other successful programs in corrections, a single incident can mar the reputation of a generally successful initiative. However, in this case the incident can be a lesson for all of us.
An audit by a computer security company found files containing names and addresses of children, as well as pornographic pictures and messages concerning children. Over 8,000 files were discovered, some of which were apparently retreived over the internet. Some may also have been transmitted over the internet to pedofiles outside of prison. The apparent purpose of the lists was to enable pedofiles to identify specific children, and to use specific personal information to gain the child's, parent's, or other responsible adult's confidence.
The prisoners involved had sophisticated abilities to use computers. The files were located in a part of the hard disk that was hidden from regular users, that required a secret password and secret procedures to access, and that would self-erase if accessed without the secret codes. One of the prisoners thought to be involved was brought up on disciplinary charges, but the charges were dismissed due to lack of evidence linking the prisoner to the files. As I said, the prisoners were sophisticated computer users.
Computers and prisoners are risky to mix, but computers are hardwired into the infrastructure of correctional facilities and operations, and few prisons are computer-free zones. There are three
reasons further computerization is inevitable:
Regardless of the risks, correctional facilities will be required to use more and more computing and telecommunications systems. Government in general will integrate advanced computing into every aspect of public service, and correctional facilities will not be permitted to remain museums of quill-pen management.
User Identification: A computer system should be designed to assure who is using the system. Traditionally, usernames and passwords have been the primary tools for user identification. New techniques involve smart identification cards, physiological means of identification such as voiceprints, eye scanners, or fingerprint and handprint scanners.
Firewalls: A firewall is a barrier, developed with equipment or with software, that limits access into or out of a computer network. A simple firewall can be created with space -- not connecting computers to other computers and systems that should not interact. This strategy can be defeated, however, by motivated users with diskettes. Sophisticated firewalls are combinations of software and hardware that limit the movement of information across networks by monitoring the information exchanged and by limiting the ways that it can move.
Application Security: A secure application reinforces user identification and network firewalls, but also limits the ability of the user to "hack" the application itself by modifying how it works.
The easy answer would be to limit the use of computers in prisons, especially when prisoners might be involved. However, that answer will not work because we will not be able to limit computing and telecommunications technologies in prisons. The real answer is to become actively involved in understanding and guiding how these technologies are introduced, so that design and development is influenced by people who understand the risks and challenges of correction operations.
Minnesota has the reputation for innovation as a state government
and as a corrections system. I expect that, when we look back on
the Lino Lakes incident 20 years from now, we will see that it
was the first of a series of challenging and frustrating
incidents involving correctional computing and telecommunications
across the nation -- unpleasant wake-up calls for corrections
professionals as they enter the 21st century.
Prisons and Prisoners on the Net
by Ned Benton
Copyright Corrections Managers' Report, December/January 1997
Should prisoners be permitted to use computers that are connected to the internet? Should they be allowed near to computers at all? An incident at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Lino Lakes, recently featured in the New York Times (November 18, 1996) frames the issue in frightening terms.The lesson
So what's the lesson here? Obviously, the lesson involves the risks of mixing computers and prisoners. But prisons, prisoners, and computers are all complex, and the conclusions that we can draw require some careful evaluation of the exact risks involved.
Computers Likely to Remain Part of Prison Infrastructure
Regardless of Risks
Systems for Prisoner Access: The Benefits, Risks, and Tools
There are clear benefits to prisoner access to well-designed computer systems. The benefits occur when they save correctional labor, expedite the transmission of information, and improve the scheduling and logistical management of correctional operations. The following are some examples of ways that computing and telecommunications will transform correctional operations:
Manage Risks By Planning Systems with Security
All computer systems should be planned, designed, and monitored with security in mind. There are several basic strategies involved, focusing on user identification, network firewalls, and application security.The Lino Lakes Lesson
With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we can see that the Lino Lakes incident occured because many basic security concepts were not implemented. Application security was inadequate, a secure firewall from the internet does not appear to have been in place, and user identification was insufficient.